AN ECONOMIC SECURITY COUNCIL by Haq, Mahbub ul
Mahbub ut Haq
1 INTRODUCTION
The global agenda is changing fast. Instead of a pre-
occupation with East-West Cold War and nuclear
security, there is finally a rising concern with many
issues of human security.
While economic and social issues are rising to the
top of the global agenda, paradoxically, there are
no global institutions of economic governance able
to handle these issues effectively and on a regular
basis. Institutions of global economic governance
have weakened exactly at a time when global inter-
dependence has increased. A serious vacuum is
emerging in global economic management which
is being filled in at present through ad hoc
improvizations.
It is in this milieu that the establishment of an
Economic Security Council (ESC) within the United
Nations has become imperative. In fact, after 50
years of experimentation with the UN and Bretton
Woods systems, this may be the most revolutionaty
and indispensable innovation for the 21st century.
It is necessary that ESC is created not through
stealth but through a thorough understanding of
the role of global economic governance which is
presently wandering in search of leadership. It is
also essential that ESC should enjoy a clear and
comprehensive mandate for decision making in
agreed areas of social and economic governance.
This article explores these issues.
2 PRESENT FORUMS
There are some who argue that a new forum like
the Economic Security Council will be impossible
to establish since it will require a change in the UN
Charter and a political will of heroic proportions.
They recommend instead a strengthening of the
present forums or a gradual enlargement of the role
of these forums over time, as a substitute for the
creation of an Economic Security Council. Such
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advice, well meant though it is, misses the point
since bureaucratic skill can never replace political
will. If political will is lacking, it is lacking just
as much for giving a more meaningful role to the
present forums. Often a courageous new step helps
focus the collective human mind: minor adjust-
ments in existing arrangements go unnoticed and
have little impact. This was the thinking behind
the edifice of global economic governance that was
erected in the 1940s.
The' thesis for enlarging the role of the present
forums is, however, quite pervasive and it cannot
be dismissed so lightly. It must be dealt with
effectively before turning to the need for a new
Economic Security Council.
There are several forums which perform the role
of global economic governance, in one form or
another, with often overlapping mandates. The
following are the most important forums:
G7: The most powerful for global economic man-
agement at present is the Group of Seven industri-
alized countries with some of the largest economies
in the world (USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK,
Canada and Italy). Their annual summits, with
quiet bureaucratic coordination throughout the
year, normally set the tone for financial and mon-
etary policies at the global level.
There are two major problems with this format.
First, of course, is its limited country coverage. All
the developing countries and former socialist bloc are
left out of its composition. Even some of the ten
largest economies in the world (in PPP-adjusted
US dollars) are not members of G7: China, India,
Brazil and Russia. The G7 membership represents
only 12 per cent of the world's population. While
G7 has tried to co-opt Russia as well as the Euro-
pean Union by inviting their representatives to its
annual summits, this is more a cosmetic gesture
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than of any real significance. Nor can it make up
for the absence of the developing world. Any fur-
ther co-option, like inviting a few powerful
nations of the developing world, will hardly be
meaningful, unless there is equality of rights in
decision making, in which case we are already
approaching the format of the Economic Security
Council.
A second problem with G7 is its policy focus. The
issues that G7 normally considers fall within a
narrow range of macroeconomic management,
particularly in the monetary and financial fields.
It neither considers nor takes any far-reaching
decisions on some of the most urgent problems
confronting the global community: for example,
population growth, environmental degradation,
drug trafficking, flow of refugees, food security,
child survival, women's empowerment, human de-
velopment. These are certainly some of the most
urgent issues of human security. Yet G7 has delib-
erately interpreted its mandate more narrowly,
confined to monetary and financial issues where it
felt that it could exercise greater clout. Even that
role is currently challenged by the emergence of
many new centres of financial wealth in the de-
veloping world. But the main point is that there is
no way that G7 can deal with some of the broader
issues of human security which require a wider
international consensus and the willing consent
of many nations.
Thus, G7 can continue to play a useful role in co-
ordinating the policy frameworks of some of the
most powerful industrial nations. But its mandate
to step beyond this role into larger issues of global
governance will be increasingly challenged in the
21st century.
Development and Interim Committees: These are
the guiding forums of the World Bank and the
IMF. They certainly represent some of the most
powerful policy makers in the world, normally
Finance Ministers or Governors of the Central Banks
of around 24 countries, representing various con-
stitueneies. They meet at least once (or often twice)
a year to review the global economic situations and
to take some major decisions regarding the policy
directions and operations of the Bretton Woods
twins, the World Bank and the IMF.
While these are fairly important chains in global
economic governance, they suffer from even more
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flaws than G7. They certainly do not enjoy the
power and the clout of G7 and their agendas are
more narrowly focused on issues of particular con-
cern to World Bank and IMF. While developing
countries are certainly represented in these forums
- and are also assisted by the professional work of
their own G-24 - their voices and influence are
fairly limited. Again, while these forums can con-
tinue to play a useful role in certain specialized
areas, they are not in a position to deal with the
larger issues of human security nor will they ever
be trusted with such a mandate.
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): The
ECOSOC was set up within the UN to deliberate
on many of the socioeconomic issues which are
now on top of the global agenda. The question is
often asked: has ECOSOC played such a role so
far? And can it be revived at this stage to play a
more effective role in future? Unfortunately, the
answer to both these questions is a resounding no.
There are many things that went wrong with the
workings of the ECOSOC right from the start. In-
dustrial countries never trusted its governance
pattern based on one-country-one-vote. They pre-
ferred to take important economic issues to their
own forums (like G7 in recent years) or to multi-
lateral institutions dominated by them (like World
Bank and ¡MF). The ECOSOC became a fairly
unwieldy forum for any serious decision making,
with a total membership of 54. It lacked a pro-
fessional secretariat which could distil and pre-
sent attractive policy options to the international
community. It quickly degenerated into a talk-
session, all noise and no action. Its annual sessions,
lasting over a month, became pointless exercises.
After some time, even the ministers from develop-
ing countries lost interest in attending ECOSOC
sessions, let alone the more powerful industrial
nations.
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There is an influential segment in the UN that has
argued for a revival of ECOSOC with more effective
powers. There are some well meaning observers
who suggest that a gradual evolution of the pro-
posed Economic Security Council can best be se-
cured by first setting up a small Executive Commit-
tee of ECOSOC (or through expanding its present
Bureau) and using it for ministerial level consul-
tations and decisions. While many such proposals
are attractive on paper, there is little chance that
they will ever succeed.
There are always many hurdles in tinkering with
existing forums. Developing countries are unlikely
to accept a more limited ECOSOC: some of these
countries have been arguing for a more universal
body so that they can all get their representation.
Moreover, old traditions die hard. Each time an
innovation is tried, many bureaucrats will hold it
up in the name of established practice. Trying to
convert useless talkathon forums into streamlined
decision making forums is like trying to turn a
tortoise into a swan. The miracle may happen but
it is never a good idea to bet on it.
The most important reason for opting for a new
Economic Security Council rather than a refur-
bished ECOSOC is a different one. If institutions of
global economic governance are to be strength-
ened, it would require tremendous political leader-
ship and courage. Why waste such political capital
on retooling an old jalopy when a new car can be
designed to fit new needs? Those who believe that
an effective ECOSOC can be created while it is
impossible to set up a new ESC are guilty of a self-
serving error in logical reasoning. Normally, it
would be far more difficult to get the attention of
policy makers to restructure old forums than it
would be to argue that new realities require new
institutional responses since we have already ex-
perimented with the present institutions of global
governance for the last 50 years. The ESC proposal
offers the option of designing a new framework
that can serve the interest of all nations and all
important constituencies.
Summits and UN Conferences: Another ad hoc
improvization for global governance that has be-
come fairly popular over the last two decades is the
holding of periodic international conferences or
summits, often under the umbrella of the United
Nations. Such events have been organized on many
diverse topics: for example, population, women,
children, education, health, environment. While
these events have greatly raised the awareness of
the world about several of these issues and some
of the summits/conferences have been extra-
ordinarily successful, e.g. the Children's Summit,
Earth Summit, Population Conference, most of
them have seldom had a lasting impact, or led
to more financial support, or resulted in some
effective implementation mechanisms. There is
increasingly a tendency to view periodic summits
as a substitute for a carefully considered solution
to global problems or even as a tribute to the
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entrepreneurs who organize them. In any case,
summits are seldom a substitute for a durable mecha-
nism for global decision making where nations meet
and debate their problems, reach several
areas of consensus, and create sensible systems
for implementation of their decisions, often through
an uneasy process of compromise.
3 WHY AN ESC?
The foregoing discussion exposes the limitations of
present forums of global economic governance. It
does not, however, answer the question: why do
we need a new Economic Security Council? And
why would such a forum be acceptable to indus-
trial or developing nations? We turn to these
questions now.
The need for an Economic Security Council rests
squarely on the new imperatives of global human
security. Issues such as global poverty, narcotics
control, population growth, ecological security,
international migration, the spread of deadly dis-
eases (like AIDS) cannot be resolved by a single
nation acting alone. They require collective action
on the part of many nations. These are the real
issues that are going to shape the global agenda in
the years ahead. Macroeconomic coordination,
particularly in the monetary and financial fields,
will continue to be needed. But they will be less
effective in a world that is politically and socially
unstable and where the security of individuals in
one nation is threatened by what happens to the
security of individuals in another nation.
This development is not unexpected. It was antici-
pated at the birth of the United Nations 50 years
ago. In 1945, in a report to the President on the
establishment of the UN, the US Secretary of
State stated:
The battle of peace has to be fought on two
fronts. The first is the security front where
victory spells freedom from fear. The second is
the economic and social front where victory
means freedom from want. Only victory on
both fronts can assure the world of an enduring
peace ... No provisions that can be written into
the Charter will enable the Security Council to
make the world secure from war if men and
women have no security in their homes and
their jobs.
It is refreshing to review this perspective in the light
of the actual developments in the last five decades.
The onset of the Cold War, immediately after the
birth of the United Nations, got the UN constantly
embroiled in many conflicts between nations. Al-
most all of these were on the soil of the Third World
where the Cold War was being fought by proxy
between the two superpowers. The development of
nuclear weapons had made any conflicts too risky
on the soil of the industrial nations.
The UN learned, and perfected, many of its peace
keeping techniques during this period. Whenever
an actual conflict broke out between nations, the
first order of business was to arrange a ceasefire,
separate the combatants, even organize zones of
peace, and initiate a dispute settlement mechanism.
Security Council powers were often invoked (un-
der Chapter VII) to impose embargoes against the
aggressor nation, particularly on arms shipments
and on some forms of trade (like the embargo on
oil shipments from Iraq). There were conventions
and treaties to cover all phases of the war between
nations: e.g. prohibition of biological warfare;
censure of bombardment of civilians; humane
treatment of prisoners of war under the Geneva
Convention.
Most of the real action in the last 50 years was
within the Security Council, even though the Coun-
cil was paralysed at times by the rivalries between
the superpowers. The rest of the UN system merely
limped along, with inadequate resources and a
weak performance in socioeconomic fields. The
first pillar of national security consumed most of
the attention in the corridors of the UN. The second
pillar of socioeconomic security was largely ig-
nored. The fact that the UN missions were often
staffed by Foreign Offices and the additional reality
that the UN represented an inter-governmental
mechanism, not an inter-people organization,
merely contributed to this neglect. Most of the
economic action moved to the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions, which enjoyed greater donor confidence.
Even in technical assistance, which was supposed
to be the exclusive preserve of the UN agencies,
World Bank and bilateral donors took over 75 per
cent of the task.
However, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, made an eloquent reference to the issue of human
security in a speech to the Preparatory Committee of the World
Summit for Social Development (22 August 1994): 'The Summit is
a time to respond to the new imperatives of human security all
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The end of the Cold War has caught the UN off-
guard, unable and unwilling so far to adjust to the
new realities. It has not recognized as yet that
most of the conflicts are now within nations not
between nations: as many as 79 out of 82 in the last
three years. It has not yet adjusted to the fact that
90 per cent of the casualties in these conflicts are
now civilians, not soldiers. It has not yet accepted
that these people-centred conflicts require a new
concept of people-centred security.2
The recent interventions of the UN in the trouble
spots Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia betray this lack
of adjustment to new realities. Soldiers are being
sent to countries crying out for socioeconomic re-
forms. External intervention is being organized,
hastily and thoughtlessly, in situations which can
be handled only through domestic action, how-
ever long it may take and whatever the cost. After
all, who are the combatants in Somalia or Rwanda?
Who are the embargoes meant to punish? Who are
the UN soldiers dispatched to separate? It is a
radically different situation when people fight
within a nation than when nations fight. Yet, the
UN is applying to these new situations the same
methods of peace keeping as it applied to con-
flicts between nations. Neither its concepts nor its
operations have changed. As a result, the UN spent
over $4 billion on its peace keeping operations in
1993, more than it spent on peace keeping in the
preceding 48 years. And what results does it have
to show for these operations?
It is time for the UN to adjust to the new imperatives
of global human security. This requires at least the
following five steps:
an early warning system to forecast 'potential
Somalias';
a reinterpretation of Chapter VII to define cir-
cumstances and modalities through which UN can
intervene in internal crises;
organization of a permanent peace corps so that
assistance is given to countries upstream to tackle
their socioeconomic problems;
over the globe ... Human securïty can no longer be considered as
an exclusively national concern. It is a global imperative ... The
United Nations can no longer fight the battles of tomorrow with
the weapons of yesterday.'
a major enlargement in the developmental role
of the UN system; and
an apex body, like the proposed Economic
Security Council, to consider the nature of global
human security crises and to take prompt decisions
to resolve them.
The threats to global human security emerge not
only from internal conflicts within nations (whether
civil wars, ethnic conflicts, explosions of poverty
and unemployment), they also emerge from what
can be best described as 'shared global crises'. All
nations of the world have an increasing stake in
the resolution of these crises. Let us mention a few
of thm since the case for a new Economic Security
Council rests on the premise that all nations - North
and South - have a major interest in attending to
these crises.
Narcotics trade: The total volume of drug traffick-
ing is estimated at present at around $500 billion a
year. The OECD estimates that $85 billion in drug
profits is laundered through financial markets each
year. These drugs are killing people all over the
world - often prematurely cutting down the prom-
ise of youth. No viable solution is possible unless
all nations collaborate in controlling demand and
supply of narcotic drugs and jointly police the
laundering of huge financial gains from drug trade.
Any effective plan must include alternative pro-
duction/employment opportunities in the supply-
ing countries, relevant information and education
in the consuming countries, and a stricter moni-
toring of financial markets.
HIV/AIDS: Deadly diseases respect no border:
they require only one person as a carrier in this
fast-integrating world. Again, any viable plan to
control the international spread of such deadly
diseases will require upstream investment in pre-
ventive health care as well as downstream invest-
ment in containment, cure and research. It has
already cost the international community over
$240 billion in research, curative measures and lost
productivity from HIV/AIDS during the last dec-
ade: probably an upstream investment of $10 to
$20 billion in preventive health care and sex edu-
cation could have avoided most of this financial
cost, and the tremendous loss of human lives.
Global pollution: Pollution is another global threat
that carries no national labels, that stops at no
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national frontiers, that can be checked only through
collective international action. This is not only true
of global warming, or the depletion of ozone layers,
or loss of biodiversity, or pollution of oceans, or
depletion of resources of soil or water or forests. It
is also true of pollution of poverty - the accumula-
tion of national despair that disrupts all global
channels. Any viable strategy requires the willing
cooperation of all nations. Besides various treaties
and charters, what is urgently needed is the en-
forcement of the principle that polluting nations
must pay at the international level just as polluters
are being obliged to pay within nations. This may
require tradable permits for environmental emis-
sions, or a tax on the consumption of fossil fuels,
or other means of pricing the market in environ-
ment. But this cannot be done unless nations meet,
discuss and take decisions by consensus through
an established forum.
International terrorism: Terrorism is also begin-
ning to travel on a global scale. Modern communi-
cations have enabled terrorists to ply their trade
across many international borders. Between 1975
and 1992, there were an average of 500 interna-
tional terrorist attacks a year. The peak was reached
in 1987, with 672 such attacks. No nation, no
individual, no building is now safe from the threat
of such international terrorism. It requires a willing
cooperation of all nations to contain these emerg-
ing threats to human security.
International migration pressures: International
migration has increased significantly in the last
three decades. At least 35 million people from the
South have taken up residence in the North during
this period. Around one million more join them
every year. The number of illegal international
migrants is estimated at 15 to 30 million. Besides,
there are around 19 million refugees worldwide
and nearly 20 million internally displaced persons
in developing countries. With the rapid improve-
ments in travel and communication, this raises
many disturbing questions about the future. Can
any national walls contain these migration flows
unless all nations cooperate and unless attention
is paid to the fundamental underlying causes of
deepening poverty and unchecked population
growth?
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These are only selected instances of emerging
global threats. They kill no less certainly than do
the occasional wars - and perhaps, more regularly
and on a larger scale. They pose a persistent threat
to human security, both in rich nations and poor.
They demand a new concept of global human
security. And they require the establishment of
an Economic Security Council.
4 ESC MANDATE
What is the mandate of an Economic Security Coun-
cil that emerges from this discussion? At the very
least, there are four areas in which an ESC could
fill in some critical gaps in the present system of
global economic governance.
First, the shared global economic crises mentioned
above. This will particularly be of interest to rich
nations since they are a shrinking minority in a fast
expanding global population and they can no
longer protect their people exclusively through
their own efforts. They need the cooperation of the
majority of the world's population. The incentive
for developing countries will be the increased
global attention to their poverty problem that an
SC will bring, since many of these global crises
cannot be resolved without attacking the root causes
of deepening poverty in the developing world.
An ESC will be a logical culmination of the present
ad hoc and ineffective arrangements. Often, these
issues are dealt with by various UN specialized
agencies in isolation, without an adequate mandate
or sufficient resources or necessary follow-up.
From time to time, high-level international confer-
ences or summits are convened on each subject,
which leave behind few mechanisms for imple-
mentation of their grand-sounding resolutions.
What is needed is continuous attention to these
issues, professional analysis of various issues taken
together, presentation of some strategic policy
options to the global community, provision of
adequate financial resources, and establishment
of follow-up actions and monitoring systems. This
is precisely what an Economic Security Council
can provide.
Second, an ESC can help establish an early warn-
ing system and modalities for global assistance in
internal conflicts. The present Security Council is
wholly inappropriate for this task. It should
confine its role to peace keeping operations for
The 1994 Human Development Report mentions five quantita-
tive indicators of an early warning system for human security:
income and job security, food security, human rights violations,
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conflicts between nations. For conflicts within
nations, an entirely different system should be
evolved through the proposed Economic Security
Council. Preventive diplomacy requires an ad-
vance warning system about what is to be pre-
vented and when. There is an urgent need for the
UN to consult the best expertise in the world and
to evolve a comprehensive early warning system.3
The ESC secretariat will continue to monitor the
situation in potential trouble spots around the globe
and alert the Council members where international
action is warranted and at what time. The UN is
currently reaching places like Somalia and Rwanda
when it is already too late and when its inter-
vention often compromises its own credibility.
New guidelines must be prepared as to where the
UN should intervene, with what objectives, and for
how long. UN intervention can be helpful mainly
in undertaking preventive development much be-
fore the situation deteriorates. What UN needs to
land in these countries is real development rather
than soldiers. And it needs to do this sufficiently
upstream to prevent an internal explosion. The
international community must recognize that it
cannot police internal conflicts, it can only hope to
prevent them.
Some developing countries are nervous that human
security can be interpreted as an 'interventionist'
concept - providing a new excuse for UN inter-
vention in domestic crises. This anxiety is obvi-
ously based on a misunderstanding. It is the present
system that is needlessly interventionist, where a
handful of powerful nations in the Security Council
decide where to intervene and how, and where
soldiers are sent to police socioeconomic conflicts
between people or between ethnic groups. It is far
less interventionist if development is sent to poor
lands rather than soldiers. And, in any case, it is
best to design some agreed rules of the game in-
stead of the present ad hoc system, and to take
decisions in an Economic Security Council where
developing countries will be represented far more
adequately than in the present Security Council.
Third, the proposed Economic Security Council
will be responsible for strengthening the UN devel-
opment system. Several structural reforms are in
order though they will require tremendous political
ethnic and other conflicts, military spending to social spending
ratio. This is a useful start but a lot more professional work is
required ni this area.
courage and a process of continuous dialogue
through the ESC. For instance, the existing dis-
persed, under-financed and uncoordinated UN de-
velopment funds and agencies should be inte-
grated into a single UN Development Authority.
Such an Authority will command sufficient re-
sources and mandate: in fact, it will disburse grants
totalling over $5 billion a year (larger than IDA)
and can have a major impact on the development
of poor nations.
An adequate resource base must be developed for
multilateral initiatives, preferably through explor-
ing the possibilities of international taxes or fees.
Many proposals are currently on the global agenda:
e.g., a 'Tobin tax' on speculative movements of
international foreign exchange; a tax on fossil fuels;
tradable permits for global emissions; a tax on arms
shipments. These require continuous dialogue at
the highest political level.
The UN development programmes should be
brought together under a single human develop-
ment umbrella with a common development mes-
sage, a single field office, and consolidated country
missions and development strategies. The present
proliferation of field offices, development reports,
and turf battles must come to some merciful end,
both in the interest of recipients and donors.
The UN development system must be based on
greater professionalism, and less political influence,
both in the selection of staff and in the analysis of
country development issues.
These are far-reaching reforms. They cannot be
made through periodic reviews of the UN system in
which the UN bureaucracy excels. International
bureaucrats, however brilliant, often deliver only
cosmetic changes. Nor can these reforms come
through a restructured ECOSOC. In order to arrive
at a consensus on such fundamental reforms, we
need a political forum - such as the proposed
Economic Security Council - where all policy
options are discussed on a continuous basis and
where new groundwork can be laid, step by step,
for the emergence of an effective UN development
system.
Fourth, the Economic Security Council will also
have to establish its mandate in giving policy lead-
ership on macroeconomic management. This will
be more difficult and more vigorously resisted.
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Many present forums, like the G7 and Bretton Woods
institutions, will be unwilling to concede this role
to the ESC. A pragmatic solution will be to build
sound credentials for such a role over time, by con-
centrating on the first three mandates described
above and by gradually winning the confidence of
both industrial and developing nations. One point
should be made clear. The case for an ESC is
sometimes argued exclusively in term of its
macroeconomic role: in aid and trade, debt issues,
monetary stability and global economic growth.
This is a mistake. There is a distinct role for the
ESC, without it having to challenge the role of
existing forums. Once the ESC is established and
proves its effectiveness in managing many issues of
global human security, it would only be a matter of
time before the compulsions for a more democratic
global economic governance attract many issues of
macroeconomic management to such a forum.
5 THE COMPOSITION OF THE ESC
When the present Security Council came into exist-
ence in 1945, the world looked a lot different. There
were only 51 members instead of the 184 today. A
few superpowers watched benignly over the birth
of the UN: many in the rest of the world were silent
bystanders.
The world has certainly changed since then. Japan
and Germany have emerged with two of the most
powerful economies. Developing countries have
won their freedom. Some Arab States have ac-
quired enormous financial wealth through oil. The
Russian empire has broken up. The dominant eco-
nomic influence of US has waned, from 50 per cent
of global output in 1945 to around 20 per cent today.
One of the advantages of establishing a new Eco-
nomic Security Council is that its composition can
reflect this new balance of economic and political
power. It may be argued that this could be accom-
plished through a restructuring of the existing Se-
curity Council as well. But that is likely to prove
much harder. The existing permanent members
are not going to surrender their seats or their veto
powers, while most nations, particularly the devel-
oping countries, are unlikely to agree to the induc-
tion of more permanent members with the same
veto power. It is best to start afresh and reflect in
the new ESC a more balanced representation of the
nations of the world and the abandonment of the
concept of veto power by individual nations.
There are several considerations which must guide
the composition of the proposed ESC:
It should give a balanced representation to the
world of today.
S It should be kept small and manageable.
It should include those countries as permanent
members which are either most populous or have
the largest real economies so that their economic
influence is recognized and respected.
The permanent members should enjoy no indi-
vidual veto power. In order to reassure both rich
and poor nations that their interests will be pro-
tected, it should be agreed that each decision will
require a simple majority of both industrial and
developing nations represented on the ESC.
All important geographical regions or political
constituencies (like the European Community or
island economies) should be able to elect a repre-
sentative on a rotating basis to reflect their interests.
Several specific formulas can be suggested which
meet these criteria. During actual negotiations on
the composition of an ESC, much hard bargaining
will take place and many uneasy compromises
reached. It is neither necessary to anticipate these
negotiations nor wise to pre-empt them.
6 OPERATIONS OF ESC
The proposed Economic Security Council can
function well only if it is backed up by a compe-
tent professional secretariat. The Council members
must be presented with relevant policy options
on a continuous basis. Such a secretariat must
function under a top development leader, maybe
a Deputy Secretary-General, second in his/her
power and influence to only the Secretary-
General.
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The ESC must meet on a regular basis, more often
than the present political Security Council. The
rotating members can send their top-level economic
ministers to New York for the duration of their
membership while the permanent members will
have to find a second ambassador with impressive
economic credentials. Some important meetings
of ESC can be held at the finance/development
minister level or even at the summit level.
The ESC must be supported by some clear source
of funding. Advice without resources often does
not go far. That is why it is important that work on
some global sources of revenue or international
taxation should be undertaken by the ESC at a fairly
early stage so that its decisions or recommenda-
tions can be backed up by real financial clout.
The ESC will be an apex body that will supervise
the policy direction of all multilateral institutions,
including the Bretton Woods system and UN devel-
opment agencies. It will have to develop modalities
for this purpose over time. Whether ECOSOC
stays in its present form or is restructured can be
decided by the ESC itself. There may be some
virtue in establishing ECOSOC as a universal body,
abolishing the present Second Committee (for eco-
nomic matters) and Third Committee (for social
matters) of the General Assembly and to use the
discussions in ECOSOC as a sounding board for the
decisions which are finally referred to the ESC.
Some analysts have argued that it may not be
possible to change the UN Charter and to establish
a new Economic Security Council on these lines.
We have already commented on the fallacy of seek-
ing marginal remedies through a restructured
ECOSOC or changes in the role and composition
of the existing Security Council. If political will is
missing, none of these other devices will work.
And if it is there, why not pick up one of the
greatest challenges we face in redesigning global
economic governance?
